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Moitra-se que o concetto de provo e' sobre-determinado no sentido que
nem todas as asserçôes comumente feitas sobre provas sâo compativeis. Mos-
tra-se como estas asserçôes diferentea podem aer reconciliadas por uma série
de distinçôes, em particular aquela entre ato-de-prova, objeto-de-prova e
traco-de-prova.
It is shown that the concept of proof is over-determined, in the tense that
not all the claims commonly made about proofs are compatible. It is shown
how theae diverse claims can be reconciled by making a series of distinctions,
in particular that between proof-act, proof-object and proof-trace.
There are many reasons for having an interest in questions
of proof. My foremost personal reason is that I have strong con-
structivist tendencies within the philosophy of mathematics and
proofs are of crucial importance to mathematical constructivism,
even at the level of meaning. The questions I shall pose con-
cerning proofs will sometimes also concern 'proof'; in particu-
lar, I shall be concerned to draw some distinctions that can be
used to resolve a number of 'proof' related ambiguities. In this
'Text of an invited lecture at the X Encontre Brasileiro de Logica, Ita-
tiaia, R.J., Brazil, May 17-21, 1993. I am most indebted to the organizers
for their kind invitation and to participants in the discussion after my lec-
ture, in particular Professors Oswaldo Chateaubriand and Michael Wrigley,
for valuable comments.
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connection, it should be pointed out that English is perhaps an
unsuitable language in which to carry out my discussion. 'Proof'
derives from the Latin probare, so, at least from an etymological
point of view, there is little or no difference between the provable
and the probable. Other European languages are more fortunate:
Swedish bevis, German Beweis, French démonstration, Dutch be-
wijs, and so on, all derive from the same stem as the English
demonstration.
The obvious first question to ask concerning proofs is un-
doubtedly:
What is a proof?
A straightforward answer to this question would be simply to
hold that if one wants to know that proofs are, one has to look
in places where proofs can be found. The right place to look for
proofs clearly is a well-equipped mathematics library, where the
monographs and the bound volumes of journals contain as many
proofs as one could possibly wish for. Consider for a typical
example:
Theorem (Arzela-Ascoli): Every uniformly bounded, equi-
continuous sequence F of functions on a compact interval
contains a uniformly convergent subsequence.
Proof: The rational points in the compact interval form an
enumerable dense set of points. Let 91,92,93«..., be such
an enumeration ..., and so on.
Clearly, whatever proofs may be, this must be one of the most
central notions: proofs are what mathematicians write down and
the we find in mathematics journals. Many other aspects of
proofs, however, are dealt with rather by philosophers than by
mathematicians. In the style of a literal-minded Oxford Ordi-
nary Language Philosopher, I can report that, upon checking a
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standard (Dutch) dictionary definition (translated into English
by me) turns out to run in the following way:
Proof
1. the act of proving; that through which is shown irrefutably
that something is as one claims or presupposed, as well in
the sense of argumentation as in the sense of justification.
3. token from which one can make out the existence or the
correctness of something, syn sign1.
Perhaps anti-anti-realist opponents will now object that the
emphasis on acts of proof given here just shows how pernicious
Brouwer's influence has been in Holland: it has even entered into
the world of lexicography2. However, the mathematical anti-
realists, among whom I count myself, can afford to remain unim-
pressed by such a charge, since it can be adequately countered
by an admissible tu quoque argumentation. The place to look
in the Oxford English Dictionary is not under 'proof', but under
'demonstration', where
3. the act or process for making evident or proving
is offered as a central meaning. Thus the importance given to
acts in connection with 'proofs', or better still, 'demonstrations',
is certainly not a Dutch idiosyncrasy, be it intuitionistic or not.
The putative critic would certainly be right, though, in his claim
that Brouwer did hold just that:
Proofs are (languageless) mental acts/processes3.
& Heestermans (1992), entry 'Bewijs'.
2Indeed, the difference between Van Dale (lexicographer) and (Dirk) van
Dalen (logician and biographer of Brouwer) is only an 'n'.
3See Brouwer (1947), p.197 and also the so-called First Act of Intuitionism
at p.140-1, in Brouwer (1952).
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This dictum has, of course, been a source of heated controversy
among philosophers of mathematics, since the term 'mental' pro-
vokes a charge of 'psychologism'. Michael Dummett, in partic-
ular, has been much concerned to offer justifications for the in-
tuitionistic critique of classical reasoning, freed from this alleged
Brouwerian psychologism4. Brouwer's pupil, and successor in
the Amsterdam chair, Arend Heyting provided the first impetus
to such work with his meaning-theoretical explanations of intu-
itionistic propositions and the logical constants. According to
Heyting, proofs of propositions are mathematical objects, 'con-
structions', that satisfy certain conditions, 'die gewisse Bedin-
gungen genügen*. In particular, a mathematical proposition is
explained by laying down what condition has to be fulfilled by a
construction-object that serves as a proof for the proposition in
question. To prove that the proposition is true is to construct
an object with the required properties. One further has to dis-
tinguish between a proposition and a theorem. A theorem is the
affirmation of a proposition. Through Mathematische Existenz,
the book by Oskar Becker, Heyting was explicitly influenced by
Husserl's phenomenology and, in particular, by the two last Log-
ical Investigations: a proposition expresses an Intention towards
a construction that satisfies certain conditions and one proves the
truth of the proposition in question through the fulfilment of the
relevant Intention. Thus a theorem is the result of an affirmation
that a certain construction fulfils a given Intention.
In the Thirties the topologist Hans Freudenthal, who had an
interest in matters intuitionistic, polemicized with Heyting over
the right notion of proposition to use in intuitionistic mathemat-
ics. Freudenthal objects to the use of 'bedingte Konstruktionen',
that is, the hypothetical constructions that Heyting needed for
his explanation of the implicational proposition from an intu-
*See a number of the essays collected in his Dummett (1978).
5See especially Heyting (1931), and (1934).
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itionistic point of view. In particular, Freudenthal claimed that:
[Jjeder Satz, wenn man ihn erst intuitionistisch ein-
wandfrei formuliert, [enthält] automatisch seinen ganzen
Beweis (Freudenthal (1937), p.112)6.
From a meaning-theoretical point of view this claim makes sense
only if we interpret Satz as 'theorem', since it would be clearly
too much to demand that a proposition should contain its proof.
Indeed, the necessary gap between meaningfulness and truth,
commented upon already by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, would
then be closed and only true propositions would be meaningful.
Brouwer and Freudenthal were famous mathematicians and
it was an agreeable feature of the foundational debate in the
first third of the century that mathematicians of the first rank
took a very active part. G.H. Hardy's very stimulating Rouse
Ball Lecture 'Mathematical Proof' provides a further example
of first-rate participation by a top mathematician. According
to Hardy (and his long-term collaborator Littlewood) proofs are
"gas", rhetorical flourishes intended to stimulate the reader, or
learner, to "see", to discover for himself (Hardy (1929), p. 18).
I want to supplement the above fairly general points about
proofs with a couple of recent remarks made in the anti-realist
literature. In his famous paper 'The Philosophical Basis of Intu-
itionistic Logic', Michael Dummett observed that:
[A] mathematical [proposition] is intuitionistically true
if there exists an (intuitionistic) proof of it (Dummett
(1975), p.239).
6
 English translation:
Every Theorem (Proposition), when formulated in an intuition-
istically unobjectionable way, automatically contains its entire
proof.
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This, of course, is a point that does not originate with Dum-
mett. The first to make it, as far as I have been able to find
out, was Paul Levy, one of the more acute participants on the
realist side of the debate referred to above, and to which Heyt-
ing contributed his explanation of the (intuitionistic) notion of
a proposition (Levy (1926), pp.545-51). Dummett continues his
remarks with a number of pertinent observations:
we have to distinguish between a proof proper, a proof
in the sense of 'proof' used in the explanations of the
logical constants, and a cogent argument. ...
We thus appear to require a distinction between a
proof proper - a canonical proof - and the sort of ar-
gument which will normally appear in a mathematical
article or textbook, an argument which we may call
"demonstration". A demonstration is just a cogent
a ground for the assertion of its conclusion as is a
canonical proof, and it is related to it in this way:
that a demonstration of a proposition provides an ef-
fective means for finding a canonical proof. But it is
in terms of the notion of a canonical proof that the
meanings of the logical constants are given (Dummett
(1975), p.240).
The computer-assisted proof of the Four Colour Theorem in
1977 gave rise to a lively discussion concerning the notion of
proof. In one of the seminal contributions a succinct list of re-
quirements on proofs was given (Tymoczko (1979), p.59)7:
(a) Proofs are convincing
(b) Proofs are surveyable
7The present section, and later passages arising out of it, were not part of
the lecture as originally delivered, but was added in response to a question
from Michael Wrigley.
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(c) Proofs are formalizable.
The first claim is, of course, nothing but the central ingredient
in the dictionary definitions that were commented upon above.
It is a point that can be found in Wittgenstein's later philosophy
of mathematics:
What convinces us - that is the proof: a configuration
that does not convince us is not the proof, even when
it can be shewn to exemplify the proved proposition
(Wittgenstein (1978), p.171).
The second point (b) can also be found in Wittgenstein, where
it is firmly stressed:
'A mathematical proof must be perspicuous'. Only a
structure whose reproduction is an easy task is called
a "proof. It must be possible to decide with certainty
whether we really have the same proof twice over, or
not. The proof must be a configuration whose exact
reproduction can be certain. Or again: we must be
sure we can exactly reproduce what is essential of the
proof (Wittgenstein (1978), p.143)8.
In a certain sense, this constitutes a further restriction of
the first point: if a proof has to be convincing, it is reasonable
to demand that it be surveyable, in order that we may become
convinced. The third point (c) was first brought out clearly by
8There are many other congenial passages in this section, e.g.
The proof (the pattern of the proof) shews us the result of a pro-
cedure (the construction); and we are convinced that a procedure
regulated in thts way always leads to this configuration.
(The proof exhibits a fact of synthesis to us), (p.159)
The interest of this passage, and especially of its rider, is manifest against
the background of Martin-Lof's paper, cited in note 12 below.
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Leibniz, who stressed the formal nature of proof. Proofs proceed
according to formal rules, that is, rules that do not depend on
the particular contents under discussion, but only on the form in
which they are presented.
A sufficient number of claims have now been listed from which
to cull a short list of theses that, one could hope, would serve to
delineate the concept of proof.
(1) Proofs are what we find in mathematics journals, etc.
(folklore)
(2) Proofs are acts of getting to know (dictionary entry).
(3) Proofs are mental (languageless) constructions (Brouwer)
(4) Proof-constructions are mathematical objects (Heyting)
(5) Meaning is explained in terms of proofs (Heyting)
(6) The theorem, when fully explicit, contains its proof (Freu-
denthal)
(7) Proofs are (rhetorical) "gas" (Hardy)
(8) The proposition A is true if and only if there exists a proof
of A (Dummett)
(9) Meaning is explained in terms of canonical proofs; "de-
monstrations", found in journals and textbooks, are
means for finding canonical proof (Dummett)
(10) Proofs are convincing (aspect of (2) above)
(11) Proofs are surveyable (Wittgenstein)
(12) Proofs are formalizable (Leibniz)
The points on our list are fairly general and rather well-known.
The question is now whether they jointly serve, not just to de-
termine the concept of proof, but in fact to overdetermine it:
Proofs are mental acts, and yet they occur on paper in li-
braries. They are mathematical objects, but also "gas". A the-
orem contains its proof, but meaning is explained in terms of
proofs, which, on the other hand, have to be 'languageless' men-
tal acts. A thorny thicket indeed!
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A first step towards a way out of this conundrum lies in a
distinction that I first applied ten years ago in my paper 'Con-
structions, Proofs and the Meaning of the Logical Constants'
(Sundholm (1983), p.164). The term 'construction' is sensitive
to a process/product ambiguity. It can be used to refer to, at
least, the following three types of entity:
(a)(Construction-)object, that is the object constructed in a
(b) (Construction-)process/act.
(c) Act/process of construction regarded as an entity.
I then remarked that Heyting's notion seemed to be that of (a),
whereas Brouwer's notion of construction seemed to encompass
elements of all three. Today I would still uphold my position on
Brouwer's view, but as to Heyting's notion I think one does more
justice to his choice of word by also including features of (b) and
of yet a further component:
(d) Construction-"blueprint",
that is, a general description for how to carry out a certain type of
construction-act/process in order to obtain a construction-object
as result.
In his lecture 'On the Relation between Mathematics, Logic,
and the Theory of Knowledge', delivered at a conference in Paris,
in April 1992, Per Martin-Lof drew attention to an analogous
tripartite distinction with respect to the term 'proof:
(a) Proof-act/process
(b) Proof-object/construction
(c) Proof-trace/track
The sense (a) is fairly uncontroversial and is the one taken from
the dictionary entry for 'demonstration', that is, proofs are acts
of getting to know. The sense (b), on the other hand, is that of
Heyting's proof-objects, that is, the mathematical construction-
objects that one has to be given in order to have the right to
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make mathematical assertions. The sense (c), finally, as far as I
know, has not been given much attention prior to Martin-Lofs
Paris discussion9.
In order to put this distinction into proper perspective it is
convenient to recall the scholastic logic that was, more or less,
current until Kant. Logic, according to St.Thomas Aquinas, is
the study of terms of the 'second intention', that is (mental)
terms that have themselves mental terms as their intention. The
most important examples here are the terms Term, Judgement
and Inference, that is, those terms that serve to indicate the
(mental) products of the three Operations of Mind. First, act
of Simple Apprehension have (mental) Terms (notions, concepts,
ideas) as their products. The second Operation of the Mind
is that of Judgement (or, perhaps better, of Judging) and acts
of judgement have (mental) propositions (judgements) as their
products. In the scholastic tradition, an act of judgement is an
act of composition, or division, with respect to two mental terms
that have been previously obtained as products of acts of Simple
Apprehension. The judgement made is thus of the form:
S:P
where the colon indicates the copula. Finally, acts of Inference,
that is, acts of the third Operation of the Mind, presuppose that
one or more acts of the second Operation have been completed.
Typically, in a syllogism, two judgements, that is, two mental
products of the second operation are used as premisses of the act
of inference, and here the product is a (mental) inference.
For all three Operations, supplementation of the mental, in-
ner, product, by means of outward tokens, or signs, is possible.
The outward sign of a (mental) terms is a spoken, or written,
term, whereas that of the (mental) proposition/judgement made
91 un moet indebted to Per Martin-Löf for telling me about the notion of
a proof-trace and allowing me to see his unpublished notes for the Paris talk.
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is an assertion. Finally, the sign/token for the Inferences are
written, or spoken, pieces of argumentation.
An important distinction with respect to acts of judgements
is that between immediate and mediate acts. In an immediate act
the division, or composition, takes place in one fell swoop, with
no intermediate steps, whereas in a mediate act, one, or more,
acts of inference will be carried out prior to obtaining the final
proposition as the conclusion of the whole chain of intertwined in-
ferences. The immediate/mediate distinction can be transposed,
from the acts of making the judgements, to the knowledge ob-
tained, that is, to the judgements made. Hence one can speak
about mediate knowledge, etc., according to how the act of ob-
taining the knowledge fares with respect to the distinction in
question.
Naturally, a number of changes can be found in this scholas-
tic, traditional, picture. Thus, according to Kant terms are not
conceptually prior ('prior in formula', or 'in definition', as the
scholastic terminology has it) to judgements. On the contrary, we
can reduce 'a/fc Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urteile' (Kant
(1787), A 69). Furthermore, the conceptual priorities between
the exterior and interior aspects of acts were reversed in our cen-
tury. The traditional view of acts in certainly psychologistic; for
instance, even for the arch-antipsychologist Frege, assertion is the
exteriorization of an interior judgement. Towards the end of the
Twenties, these priorities were reversed by Wittgenstein, and, or
so I have been told, by Heidegger10.
For the present discussion, the major change was effected by
Bolzano, who, in 1837, disposed of the old form of judgement. In
place of this subject/copula/predicate form, we now find:
A is true
where Λ is a Satz an Sich, that is, a Fregean Gedanke, or propo-
10Wittgenstein (1958), and the early sections of Heidegger (1927).
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sition m the modern sense. Such a proposition is no longer the
product of an act of judgement. Rather, it is the content of a
judgement made. The post-Bolzano (Frege, Russell, Wittgen-
stein) situation with respect to an act of judgement can thus be
drawn as follows:
Judgement
-act
content
A is true
judgement made.
When we apply the act/object terminology here, the product/ob-
ject of the act of judgement is the judgement made, that truth
adheres to the content in question. It is also natural to speak
of the act of judgement as a(n act of) proof. The object of a
proof-act is not a proof-object, but the judgement made in the
act, that is, the theorem one gets to know through the proof-act
in question.
The above scheme of the judgemental act, and its correlates,
thus raises a number of issues related to each of the three items
involved: the act, the product, and the content of the product.
In particular, the notion of truth is of central importance, since
it serves to fix the form of judgement. Frege, and Bolzano, had
little to say about the notion of truth. This, however, is hardly
surprising. It is the central, absolute, notion on, and around
which both their respective systems are developed. Consequently,
concerning this core notion, in terms of which other, less central
notions are given, one can hardly expect to be told very much.
It fell to others, in particular Brentano, Russell, Moore, and the
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Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, to offer a substantial analysis of
the notion of truth. Even though their respective efforts differ in
the details of their execution, it is not inappropriate to speak of
an analysis, since they all share a common pattern, namely that
of the truth-maker view of truth. Such an analysis holds that
proposition A is true = there exists a truth-maker for A
or, if we prefer a more scholastic formulation
= the concept truth-maker for A has existence/EXISTS.
Such a truth-maker analysis clearly depends on the category of
truth-makers for A, as well as on the relevant notion of existence.
Owing to this one cannot expect to make too many general claims
concerning truth-maker analyses in general, since many of their
properties will depend on the specific choices made. A negative
general point that can be made, though, is that the notion of
existence involved in a truth-maker analysis cannot be that of
the existential quantifier. The meaning of the latter is explained
via the truth-condition for an existential proposition, that is,
through consideration of the form of judgement:
(3x 6 D)P(x) is true
But, on the truth-maker analysis of truth, this judgement then
has to be analyzes as:
there exists a truth maker for (3x € D)P(x)
so a vicious regress would result if the notion of existence were
that of (3x € ). By the same token, we also see that the relation
of truth-making will have to be non-propositional.
On my preferred constructivistic reading, the relevant truth-
maker is, of course, the one introduced by Heyting, namely, that
of a proof(-object) of the proposition in question. Here the link
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with meaning is also clear: you explain the proposition by ex-
plaining what is required of a proof-object.
The notion of existence, on the other hand, is also tied to
constructivist notions, and was, as far as I know, adumbrated by
Hermann Weyl11 When α is a general concept, that is, a notion
such that
a : a
is a logically possible judgement for certain terms a, then
a EXISTS
is a form of judgement. In order to explain a judgement one has
to explain what one has to know in order to have the right to
make the judgement in question. For an existential judgement,
what one has to know in order to have the right to make the
judgement is that the concept α is instantiated, that is, has to
know an:
11
 Weyl writes:
Ein Existentialsatz - etwa "es gibt eine gerade Zahl" - ist
überhaupt kein Urteil im eigentlichen Sinne, das einen Sachver-
halt behauptet; Existential-SachverhaJte sind eine leere Erfind-
ung der Logiker. "2 ist eine gerade Zahl": das ist ein wirkliches,
einem Sachverhalt Ausdruck gebendes Urteil; "es gibt eine ger-
ade Zahl" ist nur ein aus diesem Urteil gewonnenes Urteilsab-
strakt (1921, p.54).
(English translation
An existential Proposition - for instance, "there is an even num-
ber" - is not at all a proper judgement that expresses a state
of affairs; existential states of affairs are an empty invention
of logicians. "2 is an even number" : that is a real judgement
that expresses a state of affairs; "there is an even number" is
only a judgement-abstract that has been obtained from this
judgement.)
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α : α.
12
.
Enough preparatory work has now been carried out so as to
illustrate the distinctions made above. When I prove a math-
ematical theorem, I carry out a mental act of proof. This act
of proof encompasses an act of construction that produces a
construction-object c that 'satisfies certain conditions', depend-
ing on the proposition A that serves to give content to the theo-
rem in question, and required by the meaning-explanation of A.
On the basis of this construction, with the ensuing construction
object, I am entitled to affirm the theorem:
A is true
Owing to the truth-maker analysis, this theorem is of the form:
the concept proof-object of A has existence.
Thus, in the explicit version:
construction c is a proof-object of the proposition A
it does contain its proof(-object), just as Freudenthal claimed. It
should be noted here that on this proof-theoretical version of the
truth-maker analysis, the novel, Bolzanian, form of judgement:
A is true
has been brought back to the traditional:
c:A
that is:
12The explicit formulation of the form or EXISTS was given by Martin-
Löf in his lecture "Analytic and Synthetic Judgements in Type Theory",
forthcoming in the preceedings of the Workshop on Kant and Contemporary
Philosophy, Florence 27-30 May 1992.
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construction c is a proof of proposition A
in the sense that the former is regarded as an ellipsis for the
latter.
The proof-act and the proof-object have now been accounted
for. The proof-trace still remains to be treated of. When the
proof-act has been completed, what remains is its object, that is,
the theorem proved/judgement made, part of which is a proof-
object, being the construction-object of a construction-process.
The theorem is the product/object of the act, but other traces
might still be left. Martin-Löf considers the case of a tour of cross-
country skiing, performed by a sportsman. The act, or action, is
that of completing a certain tour. Its object, naturally enough,
is the goal reached. The trace, or track, left by this act of skiing,
is, in this particular case, owing to the nature of the activity,
nothing but a pair of tracks, perhaps also supplemented with
signs or flags. This trace of the act of skiing has the property of
enabling another sportsman to carry out an act that will produce
the same object, namely, the goal in question, simply by following
the pair of tracks and attending to the flags and other signs. The
act of skiing might leave yet a further trace in the form of a
written record or description of the path taken. Also this form of
trace might serve to enable someone to carry out an act of skiing
that will complete the same tour as the original one. Indeed,
this seems to be the exact situation with respect to travel-guides
(provided, of course, that they have not been written on the basis
of "armchair travel", that is, the copying other travel-guides).
In addition to Martin-Löf 's example we might add two more.
One drawn from culinary art and the other from the game of
chess. For the first, consider the act of preparing a Sauce Béar-
naise: one prepares a reduction of pepper, vinegar, tarragon, and
an egg-yolk, into which lukewarm melted butter is whisked in
drop by drop. The object of the act is, of course, the sauce itself.
The trace of the act of preparation can be found in the kitchen:
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a half-empty bottle of finest vinegar, a mortar and pestle with
traces of white and black pepper-corns, tiny twigs of tarragon,
tiny specks of melted butter, a buttery au bain marie pan, a
set of used knives, forks and spoons, etc. If the utensils have
been stowed away in the order they were used, a gifted culinary
expert could possibly abduct the making of the sauce in question.
Whether the act could be copied with the same ease as in the case
of the skiing example given by Martin-Löf is, however, doubtful.
Indeed, the written trace, or description, that is, the recipe, for
(the act of) preparing the sauce, here seems essential for enabling
someone else to produce the same object13.
One should note here that a description of an act need not be
obtained as a trace of the act. An act clearly can be described
upon its completion - first I did this, and then I did so, etc. - but,
in principle a set of instruction can be written down irrespectively
of whether they haven been carried out or not. Someone could
create a delicious dish mentally, write out a recipe and leave the
actual realization to a chef. Similarly, one could draw up a skiing-
tour simply by looking at a map and writing out a set of suitable
directions, without the tour's ever having been made. A further
parallel is that of a composer working with, or without, a piano
while composing. In the former case, but not in the latter, the
score will be a trace of the act of playing various pieces of music.
Consider now a game of chess being played. Here the act is a
joint act of two (or possibly more, ' Beratende', as they are called
in old-fashioned German chess books) antagonists. One way of
taking the product/object of this act is, of course, the completed
game itself. I prefer, however, to view the result of the game,
13Per Martin-Lof pointed out in conversation that the recipe might best be
seen as a programme and the raw-materials used as the input. The execution
of the programme/procedure/recipe has the prepared dish as its result. The
recipe together with the mise en place of raw-materials is hence the analogue
of a non-canonical proof-object. The finished dish obtained through the
execution of the recipe, on the other hand, is in canonical form.
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that is, the win/loss, or draw, as the object/product of the act of
playing. In this case, the trace of the act of playing that produced
the result in question, will be the signed score-sheets of the play-
ers. Other players, or they themselves, for all that matters, could
use the score to play the game all over again14. If the game is of
a very high quality, and/or, the players involved very eminent,
say of top Grandmaster level, the score might be published in
chess journals all over the world, in which case the traces of the
(act of playing the original) game have become quite substantial.
Many these journals will carry, not only the moves played, but
also more or less thorough annotations, often by one of the oppo-
nents - most commonly, the winner. These annotations do not
constitute a direct trace of the act of playing the game, but only
in an indirect sense are they called forth by the original act of
playing. The winner, for instance, would not have written these
annotations had he not won the game, of course, but further in-
ducements might be needed, such a sizeable fee. They are also
not necessary in any way for a replaying of the game; rather they
serve as hints for how to play the game of chess in a skilful way.
They belong to chess methodology, rather than to chess itself.
Also in the other case something similar is not unknown. Good
guides to culinary art often provide analogous advice, such as
that of adding some very hot water to a butter sauce that has
curdled, or that of recommending the making of a mayonnaise
with eggs at room temperature, but not colder, etc.
If we now return to the mathematical case, we see that the
proof-traces here commonly correspond to the recipes in works
in culinary art, or to the score-sheets of music, etc. They are the
proofs we find as 'proofs' in mathematical journals and mono-
14
 Although it is questionable whether they would then be playing a game
of chess; the Laws of Chess (Article 15.19(a)) do expressly forbid the use of
written material as an aid during the playing of a game of chess. This rather
subtle point concerning the identity of games relative to their rules is not of
importance for my example and need not detain us further.
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graphs. The annotations of chess, and the hints from culinary
art, correspond to pointers within the methodology of mathemat-
ics. Thus, here one would not be concerned with a description
of an act of construction for a particular proof-object, but more
with general, "strategic", principles for how to find proofs-objects
with certain properties. Polya's work on 'plausible reasoning'
here springs to mind.
It is now convenient to return to the list of points (1)-(12)
above, that served to overdetermine the concept of proof,, with a
view to disentangling the issues through the use of the distinc-
tions just drawn. Point (1) concerning proofs in books and jour-
nals clearly refers to proof- traces, whereas the dictionary/Brouwer
points (2) and (3) concern proof-acis. The Heyting's claims (4)
and (5), as well as the Freudenthal point (6), hold for proof-
objects. Hardy's (7), on proofs as 'gas', deals with the traces, or
descriptions, of acts of proof.
The three points culled from Tymoczko are also easily dealt
with. The proofs that have to be convincing (10) are, of course, in
the first instance, the proof-acte. However, in a derivative sense,
also a proof-trace can be "convincing", namely when the proof-
acts it describes are convincing. The surveyability (11), on the
other hand, refers to the proof-fraces. The proof-object obtained
from a proof-act carried out according to a surveyable proof-trace
will also be surveyable. Finally, Leibniz' point concerning the
formalizability of proofs (12) concerns the proof-objects, traces
and acts. Mediate proof-acts have to be analyzable in terms of
immediate steps according to certain formal rules. Of course,
such rules need not be explicitly formulated prior to the act,
since it is possible to discover new axioms and formal rules.
The two Dummett points (8) and (9), finally, demand a more
careful analysis. As soon as the meaning of a sentence has been
explained, that is, as soon as the proposition has been grasped,
the proof-object will be a logically possible object in the sense
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that it has been laid down what properties it must have. The
notion of a proof-object of a proposition is not a contradiction in
terms. Since no explanation has been given of what proof-objects
for numbers would be, a proof-object for a natural number, on
the other hand, is not a logically possible object; one would get
a category mistake. For any proposition, also for the absurd
proposition JL, a proof-object for the proposition in question is a
logically possible object. Only for some propositions, though, is
a proof-object really possible, in order to speak with Kant. For
instance, a proof-object for JL is only a logical, but not a real
possibility. Finally, for a proved proposition, the proof-object is
even actual15.
Thus, the truth of a proposition will also be further analyzed
according to the modal status of the proof-object in question. As
soon as the proposition has been explained we can use the notion
of its truth simpliciter, that corresponds precisely to the proof-
objects' being logically possible. A proved proposition is actually
true. The notion of a potential truth, that is, a proposition for
which a proof-object is really possible, finally is used to make
sense of such clauses as:
A V B is true
iff
A is true or B is true.
Here, A V B can be actually true, that is, known to be true,
without it either being known that A is true or that B is true.
On the other hand, given that a proof-object can be found for
AV By one can be found for A or one can be found for B (but
need not yet have been found, of course). Thus, potential truth
is preserved.
Meaning is explained in terms of canonical proof- objects. Just
as natural numbers can be given in direct or indirect ways, so can
15See Per Martin-Lof (1991), pp.141-149.
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proof-objects. In formal systems
0, s(0), 5(5(0)), ..., and so on,
are the canonical terms used for the natural numbers whereas in
the standard informal language of mathematics the Arabic nu-
merals serve as canonical terms for the natural numbers. In the
appropriate terminology of Wolfgang Kiinne, they are 'presenting
terms'16. Natural numbers can, however, be given in countless
other ways, using, for instance, various primitive recursive func-
tions or what have you, to produce highly complex number terms
that must yet be evaluated to canonical form. The same holds
also for proof-objects. The proof-objects provided by the above
Heyting(-like) meaning explanations are all in (Gentzen) „intro-
duction form, but as we all know, it is certainly possible to prove
the truth of a proposition by means of non-canonical inferences,
for instance, applications of elimination rules, and the proof-
object provided in such an act of proof will be non-canonical,
but must, of course, be évaluable to canonical form. Thus, the
canonical proof-objects stand opposed to non-canonical proof-
objects. Properly speaking, Dummett's "demonstrations", on
the other hand, do not correspond to non-canonical proof-objects.
Just as the canonical proofs, the latter are mathematical objects,
whereas the Dummett "demonstrations" are written proofs in
journals, intended to convince. Within the present framework,
they are proof-traces, rather than non-canonical proof-objects,
and so, it appears, that Dummett has conflated two distinc-
tions, owing to his neglect of the fundamental distinction between
proof(-acts) of theorems and proof(-objects) of propositions.
Wittgenstein wrote:
I should like to say: mathematics is a MOTLEY of
techniques of proof. - And upon this is based its
"Künne (1983), §4.7.
Manvtcrito, Campinas, XVI(2):47-70, outubro 1993.
68 QUESTIONS OF PROOF
manifold applicability and its importance (Wittgen-
stein (1978), p.176).
Indeed, it is not possible to list in advance all the ways of proving
a proposition. What can be done, and what has to be done, is
to lay down in advance what properties a canonical proof-objects
has to have. In order to explain the proposition, 'gewisse Bedin-
gungen', to be satisfied by the mathematical constructions that
serve to prove to proposition in question, have to be laid down.
But for these strictures on canonical proofs, nothing further is
imposed. Thus, there will, in general, be no end of non-canonical
means for presenting objects of the right type. The only require-
ment is that the presentation chosen be effectively évaluable to
canonical form. In the same fashion, the creative acts of math-
ematicians are in no way circumscribed or hampered, save as
required by the meaning-explanation for the proposition serving
as content of the theorem (to be) proved. All and any means are
admissible for obtaining the sought-after proof-objects, always
provided that the latter admit effective evaluation to canonical
form as specified by the relevant meanings.
This, then, is the most liberal resolution I have to offer for
(at least some of) the tensions present among the theses (1)-
(12). Similarly, I also hope to have made clear how the threefold
distinction between proof-acts, -objects, and -traces, serves to
provide answers to a fair number of difficult questions of proof
implicit therein.
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